AFRO BAROMETER
LET THE PEOPLE HAVE A SAY

Working Paper No. 155

On the primacy of weak public service provision in rural Africa: Malians redefine 'state breakdown' amidst 2012 political crisis

by Jaimie Bleck and Kristin Michelitch

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by Jaimie Bleck and Kristin Michelitch | March 2015

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Abstract

In 2012, Mali faced a dual state breakdown disrupting nearly 20 years of democratization – a coup and a secessionist insurgency. This paper provides the perspectives of rural Malians living on the border of state- and rebel-controlled territory. Our main finding is that villagers defined "the crisis" as one of unmet need for public services and infrastructure. State breakdown matters less where the state is not present in the first place. Rather than the state, villagers were largely reliant on local traditional authorities. The salience of villagers' concerns about public services and infrastructure, as well as general basic needs insecurity, are echoed in cross-national Afrobarometer data (2012-2013) on public service provision across rural and urban citizens. In nearly all sub-Saharan African countries, the urban-rural gap is large, absolute levels of rural provision are low, and countries are inconsistent in provision across indicators. We conclude by drawing implications of weak state public service and infrastructure provision for citizenship in rural areas.

Acknowledgements

We thank Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle for their insightful comments, Kevin Fridy for creating our map, as well as Liana Cramer, Jae Won Kim, and our team in Mali for excellent research support. This research was funded with generous support from the National Science Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, the Catt Prize, and the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts at the University of Notre Dame.

We are not in Mali. We don't eat, we don't sleep, we don't have any health or sanitation infrastructure, no schools, no water. … The state has abandoned us. There is nothing for us but poverty and the misery of peasants.

— **Respondent, Village 5, Mali, June 2012 amidst Malian state breakdown**

In April 2012, the world's eyes turned to Mali's dual political crisis – a coup and the subsequent rebel takeover of three northern provinces. These events disrupted nearly 20 years of democratic consolidation in what was considered one of West Africa's leading democracies.[1] Academic, policy, and journalistic accounts of these events have focused on elite actors' motives, the French intervention, the precedents of democratic breakdown, and public opinion surrounding the dramatic political changes, especially that in Bamako.[2] However, voices of rural citizens, especially those closest to state territorial breakdown, have largely gone unheard due to the difficulty of accessing and documenting their perspectives.

In this paper, we relate the perspectives of more than 600 rural citizens living in 10 villages on the border of Malian and rebel-controlled territory before and after the March 2012 coup and rebel occupation. Due to our previous engagement with the villages prior to state breakdown, the research team was able to revisit in May and in June/July 2012 during the crisis. We collected data using mixed-method research to allow respondents a large degree of autonomy in revealing preferences about policy priorities before and during the crisis. Specifically, villagers were (1) asked about their policy priorities if they were the country's leader, (2) able to select a pre-recorded radio clip from a range of topics, and (3) invited to record a message to U.S. President Barack Obama.

Our major finding is that villagers were not, as most of the world has been, particularly focused on the state's regime change or territorial breakdown. Instead, villagers were overwhelmingly concerned about a different crisis – one of basic human development needs and lack of vital public services (e.g. health clinics, education, agricultural extension services) and infrastructure (e.g. water, roads). As revealed in the opening quote of this paper, villagers felt disconnected from and "abandoned" by the state. These sentiments were only compounded by the crisis.

Allowing the villagers to define "the crisis," we briefly take stock of how extensive state abandonment of public services and infrastructure provision for rural and urban citizens is across sub-Saharan Africa. Leveraging the most recent set of Afrobarometer data (2011-2013),[3] we find: (1) a dramatic urban-rural gap is still pervasive, (2) the absolute level of provision in rural areas is quite low – especially in areas in which non-state actors do not supplement the state, and (3) countries are not consistently high or low performers across all provision indicators, although some countries such as Mali, Niger, and Liberia are consistently low performers. Poor public service and infrastructure provision almost certainly contribute to the data showing that many rural and urban citizens continue to be plagued by physical insecurity as well as basic food and water insecurity.

This data echoes earlier Africanist scholarship emphasizing the weakness of African states in controlling a monopoly of force and delivering public services and infrastructure outside of major

[1] Wing, S. (2013). Briefing: Mali: Politics of a crisis. *African* Affairs, 112, 448, pp. 476–485.

[2] Marchal, R. (2013). Briefing: Military (mis)adventures. *African Affairs*, *112*, 3, pp. 486; Whitehouse, B. (2013). A festival of brigands: In search of democracy and political legitimacy in Mali. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, *35*(2); Coulibaly, M. & Bratton, M. (2013). Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent popular attitudes on the way forward. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2*(2): 31; Lecocq, B., Mann, G., Whitehouse, B., Badi, D., Pelckmans, L., Belalimat, N., Hall, B., & Lacher, W. (2013). One hippopotamus and eight blind analysts: A multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali. *Review of African Political Economy*, *40*, 137, pp. 343-357. Sidiki Guindo's impressive polling efforts documented public opinion through the entire period of the crisis: www.gisse.org.

[3] Afrobarometer data, Round 5, 2011-2013, available at www.afrobarometer.org

cities.[4] To conclude, we discuss the potential implications of weak state public service and infrastructure provision for citizenship in rural Mali and Africa as a whole, outlining key areas for future research.

Mali's 2012 political crisis

Given Mali's former status as one of Africa's top democratic performers, many observers were surprised when a junta toppled the democratic government on 22 March 2012 (see events timeline in Figure 2). Soldiers, frustrated at fighting an insurgency in the North of the country with inadequate arms and supplies, stormed the national radio station and presidential palace from army barracks near Bamako. The coup came about a month before scheduled national elections, in which incumbent Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) was slated to step down.

Armed insurgents in the North of Mali quickly capitalized on the political chaos in Bamako. Within less than a week of the coup, three insurgent groups – the secessionist MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), the Islamist hard-liner group Ansar Dine, and the terrorist organization Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb – occupied the three northern regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao and eventually made their way down into the Mopti region.[5] They proclaimed an independent state of Azawad (see map, Figure 1).

Figure 1: Map of Mali

Notes: The shaded northern region represents the area proclaimed as an independent state. The research area is circled in red.

[4] Jackson, R. H., & Rosberg, C. G. (1982). Why Africa's weak states persist: The empirical and the juridical in statehood. *World Politics, 35*(1):1-24; Herbst, J. (2000). *States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[5] For a catalogue of the relevant actors, see Thurston, A., & Lebovich, A. (2013). Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 crisis. Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-001.

This was the fourth northern rebellion since 1960. The rebellions have typically followed moments of political transition – after independence in the early 1960s, after the transition to democracy (1991-1997), around ATT's second election (2007), and ahead of the 2012 scheduled presidential elections.[6] In each rebellion, insurgents have claimed that northern populations have been ignored by the South-centric state, citing lack of public services and infrastructure. Weak Malian state presence and "misgovernance" have opened up space for a host of alternative political authorities.[7] The government's inability to police its own territory has led to the trafficking of humans, drugs, and cigarettes as well as kidnapping, banditry, and rebel activities.[8]

Many urban Malians viewed the coup, while disorganized and unfortunate, as injecting a much-needed shock into Mali's political establishment.[9] The junta's initial call for better weapons and support for their campaign in the North quickly transformed to capture broader popular grievances around poor service and infrastructure provision, as well as the corruption of the *classe politique*. ATT's willingness to negotiate with all actors, even those suspected of illicit activities in the North, coupled with Mali's culture of impunity,[10] further fuelled rumours of high-ranking government officials' involvement in illicit trafficking, embezzlement, and corruption.[11]

Subsequent to the March 2012 coup, various armed groups occupied Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu as well as parts of Mopti for nine months until the French intervention in January 2013. Despite the formation of an interim government, the junta held significant power until the August 2013 presidential elections. To date, the Malian government does not control Kidal, and insecurity plagues northern regions of the country.

Villages on the border of state- and rebel-controlled territory

To introduce rural citizens' perspectives on the crisis, we leverage mixed-method research conducted over a nine-month period (see Figure 2 events timeline). In November 2011, our research team endeavoured to locate 10 predominantly Bamana and Fulani[12] villages, between Mopti and Timbuktu, in preparation for a study of behaviour in the then-upcoming 2012 presidential elections. The team leaders visited the villages to greet village chiefs, pay customary respects, and gain permission to come back to conduct research. The villages were visited a second time in December 2011 to build further rapport with the chiefs and villagers prior to data collection.

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[6] For a discussion of previous rebellions, see Lecocq, B. (2010). Disputed desert: Decolonisation, competing nationalisms and Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali. Boston: Brill. Also Humphreys, M., &Mohamed, H. A. (2005). Senegal and Mali: A comparative study of rebellions in West Africa. In P. Collier & N. Sambanis (Eds.), *Understanding Civil War,* pp. 247-302. Washington, DC: World Bank.

[7] Dowd and Raleigh argue against a conceptualization of the North as ungoverned territory, proposing instead that poor policy led to the ability of non-state actors to flourish (often in cooperation with government actors). Dowd, C., & Raleigh, C. (2013). Briefing: The myth of global Islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel. *African Affairs*, *112*(3).

[8] The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Series on Democracy, Governance, and State Fragility. (2014). Illicit trafficking and instability in Mali: Past, present, and future.

[9] A post-coup poll in Bamako found 65% of respondents supported the junta's actions: Guindo, S. (2012). Analyse des résultats de l'enquête d'opinion sur la crise malienne. Working paper. Further, anti-junta demonstrations were much smaller than pro-junta demonstrations: Gottlieb, J. (2013). Civic and political behavior in Mali: Constraints and possibilities. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2*(2):19.

[10] Dougnon, I. (2013). In a time of crisis, why are the academics so quiet? *University World News Issue, 262*.

[11] Some pointed to the large amounts of aid going to the military through the Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali (PSPSDN) and the increase in the number of generals and militarization of civil posts without comparable increases in military capacity. See Wing, S. (2013). Mali's precarious democracy and the causes of conflict. U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing Paper 331.

[12] Fulani is the English appellation of the French term *peuhl*. Across all villages, 42% of respondents spoke Fula and 58% Bamana.

Figure 2: Research and events timeline



Notes: Research events labeled above the timeline, political events below timeline. Timeline shaded to indicate democratic control (dark gray) versus putschist control (light gray).

In January 2012, we conducted our first data collection. The research team consisted primarily of enumerators from the local area.[13] In each village, we randomly sampled men and women under the age of 40 by first drawing up a list of extended families' names (*du* in Bamana, *galê* in Fula)[14] and selecting 25-30 extended families in each village via a public lottery. Next, a lottery was held at the level of the extended family for one woman and one man. In total, there were more than 600 respondents in the sample. To remind the reader, there was low-level rebel activity in the North at this time, but it was three months prior to the coup and northern occupation.

After the coup and capture of the North, the villages found themselves ambiguously on the border of the state of Mali and what the northern secessionists proclaimed as the independent state of Azawad. The villages remained unoccupied by either side but were only 25-50 kilometres away from rebel- and army-controlled or -frequented towns. The research team returned in May for a second data collection and in June/July for a third data collection. Our final visit was concurrent with planting season. To encourage participation and compensate individuals for their time across the data-collection waves, we slaughtered cows and distributed meat.

It was challenging to incorporate female voices, aside from the usual difficulties resulting from women's disproportionate share of household and agricultural labour.[15] First, stating opinions on public affairs is seen as the role of the (male) head of the household. In order to gain women's participation, we sampled one man *and* one woman from each clan rather than only one man *or* one woman per clan.[16] Thus, the clan was assured that a man would voice his opinion, facilitating consent to include a woman. A second barrier is that women might be disallowed by male family members or intimidated to speak openly with a male enumerator, a stranger. In order to overcome this barrier, we invested in recruiting and training female enumerators, many of whom had little previous survey experience. A team comprising one male and one female enumerator simultaneously interviewed the male and female respondents from the clan to prevent men from observing or influencing women's responses.

Recording the voices of villagers using mixed-methods research

We created a questionnaire that was sensitive to the rural Malian context. A standard survey environment often leads to frequent "I don't know" responses, socially desirable responses (e.g. mentions of Islam), systematically biased responses (e.g. disproportionately first choices – "primacy"), and acquiescence (e.g. agreeing with any assertion, regardless of content). Such responses are examples of *satisficing*, when respondents offer up responses that seem reasonable enough but are not truthful or complete.[17]

Two major problems, among others, lead to satisficing. First, in a standard survey environment, respondents are often given only (or mostly) questions where respondents pick from a list of answer choices. However, in rural Mali, individuals almost never encounter situations in daily life in which they must pick from a list of closed options when discussing their views. The list of options can be perplexing for respondents, not only to remember all possible choices simultaneously, but also to be constrained by available options. Further, respondents might be unwilling to contradict the list of

[13] Consistent with findings that local, co-ethnic enumerators can improve data quality: Adida, C., Ferree, K., Posner, D., Robinson, D., & Robinson, A. L. (2013). Social desirability bias in African survey data. In *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco*, pp. 3-6.

[14] Our target population were those who were not village leaders, including women and "youth" males ages 40 and under, thus excluding clan heads and elders. The reason for having such a sampling procedure was due to the focus of our initial primary research agenda on the effect of national public radio exposure on the ability for such individuals to develop independent political attitudes and behaviours from male elders. However, not many individuals were over the age of 40, and in conducting semi-structured interviews with male elders (e.g. clan heads or village chief), we found similar attitudes (also reported in the next section).

[15] In order to participate in the study, the clan needed to consent to the established sampling procedure or they would be ineligible and resampled. While sampling often took some discussion to get everyone on board, no clan opted out.

[16] We thank residents of two villages from the Koulikoro region for their input on the sampling design. We work-shopped the research design with focus groups in these villages in October 2011.

[17] Krosnick, J. A. (1999). Survey research. *Annual Review of Psychology, 50*(1): 537-567.

available answer options with their truthful "other" response (if understood to be permissible), as it might be seen as bold or rude.

Second, a standard survey environment typically bombards respondents rapidly with question after question on diverse topics for up to an hour. Individuals are not used to stating direct and complete opinions after the first prompt and then moving on to a different question. In the context of rural Mali, conversation partners typically acknowledge one another's ideas by repeating them and prompting for more, allowing individuals' opinions to emerge gradually. Indeed, marginalized populations such as women and youth, who are often not invited or allowed at village meetings, may not be used to voicing so many opinions on politics, especially to enumerators – strangers from outside the village.

Instead of utilizing standard closed-ended survey questions, we take lessons from qualitative research scholarship to elicit the true opinions of rural Malian villagers.[18] To measure attitudes toward the crisis, we leverage a variety of techniques. First, to elicit attitudes about national policy priorities, we ask an open-ended question: *What would you do if you were the leader of the country?* This question was asked in the first and third data collections, allowing us to contrast views before and after the onset of state breakdown. In each wave, enumerators used follow-up prompts asking the respondents to further explain and justify their answers. The responses were typed into mobile devices and later coded for statistical analysis.

Second, we asked respondents to pick from a set of radio clips on different news topics: agriculture, health, music, current regional political events, current national political events, sports, or no clip.[19] To remember the choices available, respondents were shown icons representing the options, so they could easily consider which topic they wanted to hear about, if at all (see Figure 3). Respondents would then listen to the radio clip of their choice in their mother tongue. The audio clips and icons neatly allowed illiterate respondents (the vast majority) to reveal their priority area for new information through behavioural choice. All respondents wanted to listen to a radio clip, perhaps reflecting the information-constrained environment of the villages. We repeated this exercise in the first and third rounds of data collection.

Figure 3: Listening option icons

Third, we asked respondents if they would like to record an oral message to U.S. President Obama in the third data collection. Respondents were told they could say anything they wanted and could come back later in the day to record the message. The messages were transcribed, translated, and coded into categories for statistical analysis.

Last, semi-structured interviews took place with villagers and village chiefs. Indeed, spending nights in the villages allowed for candid conversation around tea and meals. Importantly, one of the authors is proficient in Bamana and was able to speak directly to village chiefs and villagers in Bamana-speaking villages.

Taken together, such a research methodology is costly, but it allowed us to tap into villagers' perspectives. Such questions and activities take more time in training and enumeration than

[18] While clearly operating outside of the ethnographic method, we attempted to incorporate an "ethnographic sensibility" into our research design. Edward Schatz defines this term as "to glean the meaning that the people under study attribute to their social and political reality." Schatz, E. (2003). *Political ethnography.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 5.

[19] Question translation: "We have a few radio excerpts that we can play for you. Choose your preferred clip, and we will play it."

standard closed survey questions. They come at an opportunity cost of asking a higher number of closed-ended questions given the same enumeration time. The transcription, translation, and coding of open responses took much effort after the data had been collected. We believe the benefits outweighed the costs of increasing response quality.

Citizen voices: Overwhelming focus on human-development crisis, not political crisis

We expected that the villagers would be very focused on the political crisis – the dual regime and territorial breakdowns – especially given their location on the border of rebel and Malian territory. However, consistently across the indicators and the semi-structured interviews, the villagers were overwhelmingly focused on what they perceived as a much more important crisis: lack of state public services and infrastructure that contributes to a low level of human development. Voices elicited through broader, more open-ended questions defined the meaning of "the crisis."[20]

First, which priorities would citizens pursue if they were the leader? The vast majority of citizens, both before and after the coup and insurgency, would prioritize public services, including education, health, agricultural extension, and social welfare, along with infrastructure such as water and roads. The percentage citing such public services and infrastructure rose from 65% before the coup and insurgency to 78% after. As depicted in Figure 4, regime breakdown was mentioned by far fewer people. Only 11% of respondents mentioned the low-level northern insurgency before the coup and subsequent surge of rebel activity, while after the coup and occupation, those referencing regime breakdown only increased by 3 percentage points to 14%.[21]

Next we turn to the radio programme that was most solicited by respondents. We anticipated that after the political crisis, many more respondents would be interested in regional and national news. Figure 5 shows preferred listening preferences before and after the crisis. The data demonstrates that health and agriculture are the most preferred topics before and after the onset of political crisis. There is an increase in respondents prioritizing regional news (from 3% to 8% of respondents) and national news (from 3% to 12%), but the vast majority of respondents are most concerned with development topics both before and during the crisis.

Figure 4: Citizens' policy priorities



[20] Recent work on field research stresses the need to be open to respondents' ideas that depart from a research agenda. Under these tenets, researchers need to leave space for respondents to define the topic of research. See Kapiszewski, D., MacLean, L. M., & Read, B. (2015). *Field research in political science,* p. 192. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[21] We note that opinions could reference multiple categories of issues. Therefore, percentages do not add up to 100. In the Appendix, we compare these responses to responses to a similar question fielded in the Afrobarometer survey in Round 5 in Mali. We find that the largest numbers of Afrobarometer respondents are also most interested in access to infrastructure and services.

Figure 5: Citizens' preferred news topics



Figure 6: Citizens' messages to U.S. President Obama



The messages to U.S. President Obama recorded in the third data collection reflect the same trend in focus on human development rather than the political crisis. The vast majority of respondents, 531 of 588 (90%), opted to record a message. We promised that we would send the messages to the U.S. government and a news outlet. In addition to making the transcribed messages publicly available,[22] we sent the messages to various U.S. government agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department. We also wrote a publicly available op-ed on the website The Monkey Cage.

At the height of the political crisis, almost all messages were requests for development or humanitarian assistance rather than political intervention. As the figure above demonstrates, 73% of messages cited food security/access to water; 48% called for improved infrastructure, including roads, health, and education facilities; and 35% mentioned assistance in agricultural production/animal husbandry. By comparison, only 11% of messages mentioned political assistance, often referring to general peace and stability (4% specifically referenced the insurgency and 2% the coup).[23]

[22] http://www.jaimiebleck.com/data.html

[23] We note that messages could reference multiple categories of issues. Therefore, percentages do not add up to 100.

Many messages and policy priorities articulated the primacy of food and water insecurity, addressing poverty generally, or improving agricultural means to mitigate famine. One villager stated her policy priority succinctly: "Agriculture is the most important thing in the world" (#1106708). According to another villager, "We are hungry, and we don't have enough water. A person who does not have anything to eat or drink cannot lead a normal life. Therefore we ask for humanitarian aid" (#37). This respondent stresses that when human development is so low, people are incapable of engaging in "normal" activities. Indeed, modernization theorists have long argued that individuals need to have a basic level of socioeconomic resources to engage with democratic politics in a meaningful way.[24]

Overwhelmingly, respondents emphasized the lack of public services and infrastructure as compounding the level of poverty in the area. As one villager explained, "Our concerns are health and the food supply. We live in a rural area, which has no infrastructure, so health and sanitation are major concerns. … We have nothing" (#70). Often villagers mentioned the lack of multiple public services and infrastructure:

> *A problem that we face is the need for health facilities; we must travel to [location] to receive medical care. However, money to pay for transportation to this health centre is not easy to come by, because we don't have any way to earn this money. Furthermore, the roads are impassable and can cause problems for pregnant women. If we had a health centre in our area, many of our problems would be solved. Additionally, we have problems with the water supply. (#90)*

The desire for provision of basic services and infrastructure was remarkably strong. As one man said, if he were the country's leader, he "would construct health centres, schools, and therefore assure food security for all" (#612540).

This lack of public services and infrastructure led some villagers to specifically state that they felt abandoned and disconnected from the state. In the opening quote of this paper, the respondent lamented that the state had abandoned their community. Another respondent relayed similar fears:

> *In the area, our main concern is food insecurity, the need for health facilities and agricultural equipment, and the lack of roads to our village. Additionally, the school is abandoned, left to its own fate. Who knows what the future holds? (#61)*

Other respondents openly questioned the allegiance of their village to the Malian state.

> *Most importantly, we have heard that there are agricultural subsidies for farmers, but we have not received any subsidies. I request that President Obama ask his counterpart in Mali if [village name] is not a part of Mali, because the authorities do nothing for us. (#341)*

Indeed, we find that when asked to rank the identity grouping that is most important to them, the salience of national identity is much lower than villagers' sense of village, religious, and ethnic identity.[25] As their primary identity category, only 13% of villagers cited national identity, as compared to 45% who cited Islamic identity and 28% who cited ethnic identity. An additional 12% cited village identity, while the remaining 3% of respondents ranked African identity as more important.

The villages received no agricultural extension services or state assistance to combat severe drought and ongoing climate change, which had had detrimental effects on agricultural output. During the January 2012 data collection, farmers showed us spoiled fields where they had planted rice on five hectares but only harvested enough crops to fill two bags (approximately 100 kilos) with peeled rice.

Village chiefs reported little interaction with the state except for tax agents from the department of forestry, who would annually tax each household's firewood consumption for cooking as a penalty

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[24] Among the founding texts: Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review, 53*(1): 69-105.

[25] Bleck, J., & Michelitch, K. (2013). Capturing the airwaves, capturing the nation: Citizen response to putschist-controlled radio. Working paper.

for living in the increasingly desertified zone.[26] Perceived government abandonment during the crisis was compounded when many civil servants fled further south. Village chiefs wondered whether they would be able to justify continued tax collection in this context. As one chief told us, "How can I continue to convince my constituency to pay taxes to a state that vanishes in the face of the earliest threat? How can we continue to pay taxes to a government that doesn't protect us?"[27]

Abandonment by the state at the height of the crisis provokes questions of the obligations citizens have to the state. Such a viewpoint resonates with Gottlieb's contention that there is a weak social contract between rural citizens and the Malian state. She characterizes villagers as having "general apathy toward and isolation from the democratic process"[28] Given that villages comprise 80% of the Malian population, such apathy concerns the vast majority of Malian citizens.

From the small number of people who mentioned either the territorial or regime breakdowns, messages were predominantly concerned with the effect the crises had on basic livelihoods, public services, and infrastructure. For example, respondents complained about decreased freedom of movement for grazing animals: "We want [Obama] to bring us food. The rebels tire us a lot, our goats, our cattle can no longer be brought to graze in the North because they risk being stolen" (#441). Other respondents explained that infrastructure gaps were made even worse during the dual state breakdown because state employees, including teachers and state security agents, left the area: "In [village name], we have a school, but it does not have any directors. Additionally, the building of a health centre was about to begin, but the coup has put this project in jeopardy" (#341). Price increases subsequent to the political crisis were also a large concern; villagers reported increases in sugar prices from 400 FCFA to 600 FCFA a kilo, fewer public transport vehicles, and stymied remittance flows from children living outside the village.

Indeed, the villages had very little in the way of public services and infrastructure. None of the villages were electrified or connected to a paved road. There were no police stations, piped water, or sewerage systems. There were no health centres in any of the villages, and only five of the villages had access to state schools within walking distance. These schools had been built very recently, as reflected in the fact that only 8% of respondents had been able to attend state school. In contrast, 80% of respondents had been to Qur'anic school. All villages had Qur'anic schools, which are run by private instructors rather than the state.[29] Cell-phone signals were weak or non-existent, subject to weather such as wind and sand storms. Only one radio station emission – national public radio – reached the area, the only real connection between villagers and the distant state.

Given such weak state presence, village chiefs and imams were cited as providing the majority of services and infrastructure for the villages. [30] Of course, traditional elites are well known to command authority and allegiance in rural Africa. [31] When asked who was most responsible for bringing development to the villages in our sample, for example in the area of bridges, wells, and

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[26] Chief interviews, January 2012. For a discussion of the forest service's exploitation of rural populations in northern Mali, see Benjaminsen, T. R. (2008). Does supply-induced scarcity drive violent conflicts in the African Sahel? The case of the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. *Journal of Peace Research*, *45*(6):829.

[27] Telephone interview with village chief, Village 1, April 2012

[28] Gottlieb, J. (2013). Civic and political behavior in Mali: Constraints and possibilities. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, *2*(2):19.

[29] Unlike madrassas, Qur'anic schools receive no formal assistance, monitoring, or recognition from the Malian state.

[30] We note that Mali tried an extensive decentralization project in the 1990s, which introduced municipal-level elections and attempted to devolve power and responsibility for welfare service provision to locally elected officials. The creation of elected municipal authorities diverged from previous regimes' reliance on local elites. However, analysts assess the attempt has having largely failed to improve service provision. For an extensive discussion of Mali's decentralization efforts, see Wing, S., & Kassibo, B. (2010). Comparative assessment of decentralization in Africa: Mali desk study. U.S. Agency for International Development.

[31] See pp. 301-304 in Bratton, M., Mattes, R. B., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2005). *Democracy, public opinion, and market reform in Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also see Logan, C. (2013). The roots of resilience: Exploring popular support for African traditional authorities. *African Affairs, 112*(448):353-376.

schools, 42% named the village chief, and 21% named the imam. Only 12% cited state actors, and 25% didn't know. Thus, 63% of citizens cited local-level, non-state authorities.

Respondents' justifications for naming these non-state authorities further illuminate the primacy of such actors, rather than the state, as the relevant political authorities. [32] Some respondents stated reasons of patriarchy or hierarchy: They named the chief as responsible because "the village is his property." Others spoke of the chief's better knowledge of village problems: "He is from the village and knows the problems of the village." Other respondents cited past accomplishments in the area of public service and infrastructure provision – "He has built wells here" – as well as his capacity to resolve disputes – "He established rules between us (the farmers) and the herders" or "He resolves problems between people." Last, respondents mentioned personal redistribution in the village. As one respondent said, "Truthfully, [the village chief] plays a very large role, he uses his own money to help the rest of us."

Problematically, village-level politics, the paramount politics in citizens' lives in the long years between elections, is far from democratic. Neither the state nor the villagers have a role in appointing or electing such traditional local authorities (e.g. village chiefs or religious leaders). In our sample, 47% of women and 12% of men reported *not* being invited to village meetings. Further, 61% of women and 28% of men had never contacted the village chief. Participation in local politics is thus highly constrained for many villagers.

In sum, despite being located on the border of state- and rebel-controlled territory, villagers were more focused on lack of access to public services and infrastructure than on the acute political crisis. Concern for everyday survival trumped concern over macro-politics. The real state breakdown was not defined in terms of territorial or regime breakdown, but as an ongoing state failure to provide vital public services and infrastructure. [33] The village chief and religious actors largely substituted for the state. This reconceptualization of "the crisis" stands in stark contrast to the international community's focus on achieving political stability by military conquest or holding elections to replace the junta.

The continued crisis of weak states across Africa

The definition of "the crisis" as one of weak state provision of public services and infrastructure by the Malian villagers, amidst significant territorial and regime breakdown, directs our attention to the problem of state weakness in rural Africa. Seminal scholars have long stressed the problem of state weakness in Africa, whether defined as having the monopoly of force or maintaining public services and infrastructure. When states do not enforce laws or provide public services and infrastructure, the state is "juridical" rather than "empirical."[34] The lack of empirical states across the region led Herbst to lament in the opening sentence of his book that "the fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa – be they pre-colonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent era – has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people."[35]

Is the problem of rural abandonment by the state, raised by scholars decades ago, still valid across the continent? Or is the concern more localized to these villagers in Mali and diminishing elsewhere? We briefly take stock of the external validity of rural abandonment across the continent, leveraging recent Afrobarometer data from Round 5 (2012-2013).

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[32] Respondents were asked a follow-up question about why they thought the actor they cited was most responsible. The quotes that follow were included as justifications for their responses.

[33] We do not suggest that citizens' sense of abandonment necessarily implies their readiness to "exit the state," but in fact, citizens' continued appeals to a state that has never been present is suggestive of Englebert's argument about the resilience of weak states. See Englebert, P. (2010). *Africa: Unity, sovereignty, and sorrow.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

[34] See Jackson, R. H., & Rosberg, C. G. (1982). Why Africa's weak states persist: The empirical and the juridical in statehood. *World Politics, 35*(1):1-24.

[35] See Herbst, J. (2000). *States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control,* p. 11. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

During the survey, enumeration teams were responsible for reporting whether various public services and infrastructure were present in an enumeration area: the electricity grid, piped water, paved roads, sewerage system, a police station, market stall, health clinic, and school.[36] The survey draws a nationally representative sample, but we remind the reader that this is not census data; considering sampling error, we encourage readers to focus more on trends rather than point estimates.[37] Figure 7 displays the percentage of rural citizens (triangles) and urban citizens (circles) with access to types of public services and infrastructure listed by country in order from the lowest to highest levels of rural provision.

We would like to highlight three main trends that generalize the villagers' concerns across the continent. First, the *urban-rural gap in public infrastructure and services persists*, consistent with the literature on the perennial problem of African states to project power outside of urban centres. Rural citizens consistently have less access to public services and infrastructure than urban counterparts across all indicators cross-nationally. In only very few countries do rural and urban areas have approximately the same level of access. The mean gaps between urban and rural populations' access are the following: electricity – 52 percentage points; piped water – 47 percentage points; sewerage – 42 percentage points; paved roads – 41 percentage points; police stations – 39 percentage points; market stalls – 28 percentage points; health clinics – 24 percentage points; and schools – 12 percentage points. Interestingly, the largest mean urban-rural gap is in electricity, with gaps ranging from no difference in Cape Verde to a 92 percentage point difference in Guinea.

Second, while there is variation in provision of rural public services and infrastructure cross-nationally, the *level of rural provision in the majority of countries remains extremely low*. In terms of access to basic infrastructure, fewer than half of rural citizens have access to electricity in 19 out of 28 countries. In 20 of 28 countries, fewer than half of rural citizens have access to piped water. In 20 of 28 countries, fewer than one-third of rural citizens' communities are connected to paved roads. In 24 of 28 countries, fewer than one-tenth of rural citizens' communities have access to a sewerage system. In 24 of 28 countries, fewer than one-third of rural citizens have a police station within easy reach. These indicators are good measures of state provision of public services and infrastructure to citizens, because the state is uniquely responsible.[38]

Figure 7: Provision of public services and infrastructure



[36] This data was filled in as assessed by the field supervisor. The criterion for access was whether the infrastructure was within the enumeration area/primary sampling unit or within "easy walking distance."

[37] See www.afrobarometer.org for more details on sampling and methodology.

[38] Harding, R. (2012). *Democracy and the provision of rural public goods.* New York University PhD dissertation.













Public services that can be provided by non-state actors as a supplement to state provision (e.g. religious, international aid, local community members) are available at much higher rates than infrastructure for which the state is the exclusive provider. Schools and, to a lesser extent, health clinics and market stalls reach many more rural citizens than electricity or sewerage. For example, provision gaps are lower for education in part due to liberalization and privatization during the primary school expansion of the last 20 years.[39] When non-state actors provide vital public services, it is on the one hand an improvement for citizens' lives, but it may also be problematic for the formation and maintenance of citizenship (a point we return to).

[39] Harding, R., & Stasavage, D. (2014). What democracy does (and doesn't do) for basic services: School fees, school inputs, and African elections. *Journal of Politics, 76(*1):229-245; Bleck, J. (Forthcoming). *Education and empowered citizenship in Mali.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Third, there is large variation within countries in which infrastructure is provided to rural citizens; *countries are not consistent in being high or low performers across the indicators.* Mozambique, for example, provides piped water to very few rural areas but has many police stations in such areas. Madagascar boasts many health clinics but relatively few schools. There are a few countries in the Afrobarometer sample that consistently have among the lowest relative and absolute performance: Liberia, Niger, and Mali.[40] Yet no country, even among those with relatively higher GDP per capita (e.g. South Africa and Botswana), succeeds in consistently providing all services or infrastructure to rural populations.

Figure 8: Insecurity



As the Malian villagers discuss, the absence of vital public services and infrastructure contributes to food, water, and physical insecurity. Unfortunately this sentiment, too, sees external validity beyond Mali in the Afrobarometer data (see Figure 8). About half of rural Malians reported food and water insecurity, and 30% reported physical insecurity.[41] Across the continent, 45% and 44% of rural citizens and 30% and 32% of urbanites reported food and water insecurity, respectively.[42] Physical insecurity was felt by 24% of the rural population,[43] as compared to a higher percentage (32%) of urbanites.

[40] We note that most countries that are outside of the Afrobarometer sample due to the difficulty of conducting public opinion polling there are likely to be weak service providers.

[41] The Malian Afrobarometer survey was fielded roughly one year and one-half year after our surveys in December 2012 and January 2013.

[42] Food or water insecurity is defined as going without food or water several times, many times, or always in the previous year.

[43] Physical insecurity is defined as feeling unsafe walking in your neighbourhood several times, many times, or always in the previous year.

Although substantial variation exists cross-nationally, the level of rural African citizens going without meals, water, or safe passage around home is high. While these figures may not come as a shock to some readers with intimate knowledge of conditions in Africa, it is important to document and highlight the pervasive and pressing nature of these problems across the continent.

Conclusions and implications of state weakness for citizenship in rural areas

In the aftermath of the 2012 Malian coup and insurgency, villagers on the border of state- and rebel-controlled territory defined "the crisis" as one of unmet need for public services and infrastructure as well as resultant basic needs insecurity. Acute macro-political concerns were trumped by ongoing daily struggles. Rather than state actors, local village chiefs and religious actors were viewed as the primary figures of authority and providers of public services and infrastructure.

Importantly, the state breakdown had not *just* occurred; the state was already broken prior to the coup and insurgency in its failure to provide basic public services and infrastructure. The focus on the immediate or more volatile political problems facing the Malian state by academia and the international policy community, while important, risks understating and underestimating the power of slow-moving "mundane" crises of daily life. By using a variety of mixed methods to elicit policy priorities of respondents, this research remained open to rural Malians' definition of "the crisis" on their own terms rather than guided by those themes that we (the researchers) initially envisioned.

Given the overwhelming focus of the villagers on unmet needs for public services and infrastructure, this paper took stock of rural levels of public services and infrastructure and insecurity across the region using the recently released Round 5 Afrobarometer data (2011-2013). We find that (1) a substantial urban-rural gap is still pervasive, (2) the absolute level of provision in rural areas is quite low (especially in sectors where non-state actors do not supplement the state), and (3) countries are not consistently high or low performers across all provision indicators. Food, water, and physical insecurity are prevalent and at least in part driven by state abandonment.

Thus, the concerns of the Malian villagers regarding state abandonment are by no means isolated, finding external validity across the continent. This data echoes seminal Africanist literature emphasizing the African state as "juridical" rather than "empirical." Explaining variation in state-provided public services and infrastructure provision, and discovering methods to improve their provision, is, of course, a ripe area for future research.[44] Further, understanding the consequences for citizenship of rural villagers' reliance on traditional elites remains an area deserving much future attention by the scholarly and policy communities.[45]

In particular, the villagers' testimonies in this study revealed challenges to the development of cultural, legal, and political citizenship outlined in Africanist political science research[46] First, state abandonment in rural areas may weaken *cultural citizenship,* or affective identification with a nation-state, by generating competing attachments to other authorities or communities that may be better able to provide than the nation-state. The formation of national identity in Africa is difficult due to historical legacies such as artificial borders and the illegitimacy of previous state regimes.[47] Institutions of traditional authority – such as ethnic leadership, village chieftaincy, and religious leadership – mostly pre-date the modern state as a *de jure* political unit or *de facto*

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[44] See Gottlieb, J. (2013). Civic and political behavior in Mali: Constraints and possibilities. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2*(2):19. Also Kramon, E., & Posner, D. N. (2013). Who benefits from distributive politics? How the outcome one studies affects the answer one gets. *Perspectives on Politics, 11*(2): 461-474.

[45] An emerging literature also investigates the effect of state substitution by a broader group of non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private providers, and community associations. See Cammett, M., & MacLean, L. M. (2014). *The politics of non-state welfare*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)

[46] We borrow this typology from Bratton, M. (ed.). (2013). *Voting and democratic citizenship in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. It discusses the components of citizenship, including political rights and obligations (legal), cultural (primacy of state identity), and political (participation in the public sphere). Also see Bratton, M. (1989). The politics of government-NGO relations in Africa. *World Development, 17*(4):569-587.

[47] Robinson, A. (2014). National versus ethnic identification in Africa: Modernization, colonial legacy, and the origins of territorial nationalism. *World Politics, 66*(4):709–746.

authority.[48] The relative allegiance that such traditional leaders enjoy above and beyond the state is well-documented for rural citizens.[49] Those who move to cities and towns may extricate themselves from hierarchies of traditional authorities and gain more exposure to state infrastructure and authorities, but for those living in rural areas, local traditional elites continue to dominate the quotidian landscape of governance.

Figure 9 reveals the percentage of rural and urban respondents who cite national identity as more important than ethnic identity in the Afrobarometer Round 5 surveys (top left panel).[50] While variation exists across the continent, national identity in most African countries remains weak compared to ethnic identities. In Mali and other African countries such as Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, and Niger, rural dwellers are much less likely to identify with the nation than urbanites. These statistics echo what we find in our sample of Malian villagers – national identification was much lower than ethnic, religious, and village identification.

Figure 9: Citizenship implications of (rural) state abandonment



[48] Young, C. (1976). *The politics of cultural pluralism.* Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

[49] Of course, allegiance to traditional authorities under state abandonment is not necessarily unconditional. In her analysis, Carolyn Logan finds that state underperformance does not automatically generate greater support for traditional authorities, but that traditional authorities' effectiveness (e.g. ability to resolve disputes) generates greater support. See Logan, C. (2013). The roots of resilience: Exploring popular support for African traditional authorities. *African Affairs, 112*(448):353-376. Further, under certain conditions, traditional elites who are tightly aligned with government authorities might actually bolster the salience of national identity by legitimating government authority. For instance, state officials might consciously devolve power to traditional leaders in order to gain votes and better provide services, and these local elites might spur engagement with state services and subsequently identification with the central state. See Baldwin, K. (2011). When politicians cede control of resources: Land, chiefs, and coalition-building in Africa. Afrobarometer Working Paper 130: www.afrobarometer.org.

[50] Other local identities such as village or religious identities may also be more salient, as we find in our sample of Malian villagers, but surveys, including Afrobarometer, typically focus on ethnic identity alone.

Second, state under-provision of public services and infrastructure can shape willingness toward the obligations of citizenship rights and duties, or *legal citizenship*. For legal citizenship to emerge, a strong link must be forged in which citizens receive services and infrastructure from the state and reciprocate by fulfilling duties such as paying taxes and obeying state laws. When the state provides little, or other actors provide better more, why should citizens continue to pay taxes?

Figure 9 displays the cross-national breakdown of the percentage of citizens who believe that they are not obligated to pay taxes (top right panel). Approximately one-third of rural Africans say that people are not obligated to pay taxes to the government; urban counterparts are almost always more willing to pay. In our sample, chiefs stressed the difficulty of collecting taxes on behalf of the state from citizens who get little in return. They recognized tax authorities as extractive entities that took advantage of communities rather than bureaucratic agents who fulfilled a fiscal pact with the state.[51]

Last, the level of state provision of public services and infrastructure, as well as non-state substitution for provision of such services and infrastructure, may affect the ways citizens participate in the public political sphere, or *political citizenship*. For one, exposure to public service and infrastructure provision is associated with more political participation in state politics (e.g. voting, contacting an elected representative).[52] For example, Malian parents who enrol their children in madrassas (private religious schools) vote less than public school parents.[53] Such findings suggest that exposure to state-provided services and infrastructure generates a policy feedback mechanism that encourages citizens to continue to engage with the state.[54]

Perhaps a bigger concern for political citizenship in rural areas with limited state infrastructure is the primacy of *local* politics guided by traditional authorities. Opportunities for participation in state politics, such as elections, happen rarely for most rural citizens – every four to six years. In the long stretches between these opportunities, traditional authorities largely govern everyday politics in rural areas. Such traditional authorities often (a) are not elected democratically,[55] (b) make policy decisions without incorporating perspectives of many of their constituents, and (c) have discretion over rule enforcement.[56] Indicators of democracy at the national level, including the competitiveness of multi-party elections, do not likely capture the everyday political reality of rural

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[51] Indeed, Bodea and LeBas present evidence that Nigerians with positive experience of state service delivery are more likely to express belief in an unconditioned citizen obligation to pay tax. Further, citizens who have access to local community-provided goods are less likely to adopt pro-compliance norms. Bodea, C., & LeBas, A. (2014). The origins of voluntary compliance: Attitudes toward taxation in urban Nigeria. *British Journal of Political Science.* DOI: 10.1017/S000712341400026X. Some NGO- and donor-provided services and infrastructure, however, can actually make citizens more deferent to their tax departments. See Sacks, A. (2012). Can donors and non-state actors undermine citizens' legitimating beliefs? Afrobarometer Working Paper 140: www.afrobarometer.org.

[52] See MacLean, L. M. (2011). State retrenchment and the exercise of citizenship in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies, 44*(9): 1238-1266.

[53] Bleck, J. (2013). Islamic schooling in Malian democracy: Disaggregating parents' political behavior. *Journal of Modern African Studies, 51*(3):377-408. Further, parents of public school children demonstrate higher levels of electoral participation.

[54] Other studies find, however, that exposure to *non-state* NGO service and infrastructure provision can bolster citizen participation with the state by providing them skills to participate. In Kenya, for example, civic skills of participation taught to citizens and inclusiveness of citizens in governmental bodies have bolstered participation. See Brass, J. N. (2012). Blurring boundaries: The integration of NGOs into the governance of Kenya. *Governance*, *25*(2):209-235.

[55] In countries such as Mali, Niger, and Senegal, most village chiefs assume their position via heredity.

[56] For example, Malian chiefs determine the operational rules themselves, which may or may not include counsel from male clan heads or other villagers. Despite Mali's celebrated heritage of consensual decision-making, many citizens' perspectives are marginalized or discounted as these conversations take place in the context of hierarchy. See Sears, J. M. (2007). Deepening democracy and cultural context in the Republic of Mali, 1992-2002. PhD dissertation, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

citizens governed by local traditional leaders. Mali, for example, has held five multi-party elections since democratization in the 1990s, but village chiefs occupy their positions via heredity.

Political citizenship in local politics is often the most difficult for women to exercise. Recall that about half of the women (and some men) amongst the Malian villagers in our sample were not invited to village meetings. Figure 9 reveals that, across Africa, many citizens agree that traditional authorities treat women unfairly (bottom panel).[57] Mali shows the highest proportion of respondents (60%) of any country, but at least one-third of respondents in most countries feel the same.

We are far from a complete understanding of the conditions under which citizens' cultural, legal, and political citizenship is undermined vs. reinforced when traditional authority substitutes for state provision of vital services and infrastructure. A first-order problem, however, remains the crisis of rural under-provision of public services and infrastructure and the effect such under provision has on livelihoods of ordinary villagers. The problem is so great that at the height of Mali's political crisis, citizens living on the border of a rebel-controlled area and junta-controlled territory placed more emphasis on state under-provision of public services and infrastructure than on the challenges to the territorial and democratic integrity of the country.

[57] Of course, this is an imperfect measure of whether women actually are treated unfairly, since many people in rural areas – both men and women – believe that women's marginalized status in political life is fair according to traditional custom. However, it gives us an indication that a large swath of the population perceives inequality, which is most likely to be an underestimate of actual inequality.

Appendix

Comparison of citizen policy priorities with Afrobarometer sample

It is interesting to note the degree to which the policy priorities of citizens in our sample are similar to respondents in the Afrobarometer Round 5 Mali survey despite some differences in question phrasing and timing of the survey.[58] In response to an open-ended question, most respondents cite infrastructure and services as most important to them – consistent with our own findings. The Afrobarometer question asks: *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?* Interviewers were instructed to accept up to three answers.[59]

In Figure 10 below, we show the responses of our sample pre- and post-crisis alongside the Afrobarometer responses for all Malians, urban Malians, rural Malians, and rural Malians in the Mopti region. Recall that the bars indicate the total percentage of respondents mentioning the category, but that citizens could cite multiple areas, so the percentages of the bars do not add up to 100%.

As in our sample, the highest percentage of respondents in the Afrobarometer sub-samples – more than 80% – prioritize public services and infrastructure. Higher percentages of Afrobarometer respondents reference governance or regime breakdown; this may be due in part to the differences in question phrasing or the timing of the survey.[60] However, among the Afrobarometer sub-sample, we still see important distinctions between the numbers of rural and urban respondents who mention governance issues (37% of urbanites and 18% of rural dwellers) or are concerned with regime breakdown (59% vs. 43%).[61] Being farther from city centres or areas of government control, rural citizens might also be more likely to conceptualize the crisis as one of access to basic services and infrastructure rather than who governs.

Figure 10: Malians' policy priorities: A comparison with Afrobarometer results



[58] Note that the Afrobarometer also uses an open-ended question but has not yet coded "other" responses that fall outside of its standard 33 response categories. Surprisingly, more than half of the sample of respondents provided at least one "other" answer.

[59] They were prompted to ask, *Which three of these are the most important*? if the number of responses given exceeded three, and they were prompted to ask, *Anything else?* if the respondent offered one or two answers. This question differs somewhat from our own, in which we ask, *What would you do if you were the leader of the country?* followed by prompts to explain more or justify. We did not require the respondent to cite three separate categories, and some respondents simply elaborated on one particular priority.

[60] The data in our samples was collected roughly a year and half a year prior to the Afrobarometer data (December 2012 and January 2013) – not long after the coup d'état and rebel occupation.

[61] Note that rural respondents in Mopti were less likely than the national average to cite governance issues (14%).

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Support for Afrobarometer is provided by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank.

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